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Using a simple OLG model where the research output of one generation
provides inputs for the next, the paper explains how quality standards can
become established in scientiﬁc competition. Researchers seek status, which
they get if their results are used by the next generation. Quality is hereditary
in the sense that input quality aﬀects output quality. Hereditary quality
allows for simple coordination on quality standards.
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quality standards, scientiﬁc competition1 The Problem
In this paper, I am concerned with a simple question: Why is the quality
of scientiﬁc research so high on average? For those who accept the premise,
the answer is probably obvious. Science is highly competitive. By science as
an institution, I mean academic or open science, that is, the whole system
of research-oriented universities, scientiﬁc journals, the peer review system,
learned societies, and so forth. In this system, the production of high quality
research is the way to rise to the top. Researchers compete for positions,
research grants, journal space, and status. Thus, there is an incentive to
aim at high quality but, of course, no sure-ﬁre method to produce it, which
explains why we also observe low quality.
However, pointing out that science is competitive is only half of the an-
swer. High quality in science is what researchers in the respective ﬁeld con-
sider to be high quality. Why and how do competing researchers coordinate
on common quality standards?
One possible answer to this question is that quality standards are im-
ported into science by scientiﬁc novices. After all, researchers believe in
ideals and accept standards even before they enter science. Curiosity is often
considered an important motivation for choosing a career in science, and it is
hard to see how somebody could be curious without being interested in the
truth about matters. Hence, a love of truth might be imported into science
from the outside.
1However, neither curiosity nor a love of truth are suﬃcient for judging
the quality of a research paper. According to modern philosophy of science,
no statements (or, at least, no statements of scientiﬁc interest) can ever be
veriﬁed or falsiﬁed conclusively. Hence, even for those who just seek truth, it
is not obvious how to judge the products of science, as everybody knows who
has experience with the refereeing process (see, e.g., Seidl et al. 2008, Albert
and Meckl 2008). It requires training to make these judgments. Scientiﬁc
quality standards are not easily explained to outsiders; and they are a matter
for debate among insiders. Both facts suggest that quality standards are
endogenous to science and not just imported by scientiﬁc novices.
Another possible answer is that quality standards are imposed from the
outside, by the ﬁnal consumers of science. This is the traditional explanation
in the context of markets. Consider the case of perfect competition where
all parties are equally informed about the quality of all goods. Diﬀerent
qualities of the same good can then just be treated as diﬀerent goods. In
equilibrium, consumers select the qualities they want at given prices, and
producers select inputs of a certain quality because these inputs allow them
to satisfy consumers’ wishes at minimal costs. This explanation extends to a
production process with intermediate stages where the input quality selected
upstream is determined by the output quality demanded downstream.
Open science, however, is not a market; it uses the so-called voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM), not the price mechanism. Researchers pub-
lish their ideas and results, which can then be used free of charge by anybody
2who wishes to do so. Research outputs are non-rival goods anyway; publica-
tion turns them into public goods. Since researchers are typically not paid
for their publications but receive a ﬁxed income, this is a case of voluntary
provision of public goods.
The VCM can be combined with diﬀerent kinds of incentives. In science,
status among one’s peers is an important reward in itself and the key to
most other rewards, like attractive positions or Nobel prizes. The status of
a researcher is determined by his impact on the ﬁeld, that is, by the extent
to which his ideas and results are used by by other researcher.1
In this analysis of scientiﬁc competition, there are no ﬁnal consumers.
This is not to deny that there are users of research outside science: innova-
tors, administrators, politicians, doctors, lawyers, writers of popular science
books and textbooks. However, their preferences do not inﬂuence compe-
tition within science. Indeed, this is the whole point of scientiﬁc competi-
tion. It is diﬃcult, if not impossible, for outsiders to evaluate the quality
of research, especially basic research. Scientiﬁc competition delegates the
1See Stephan (1996) and Diamond (forthcoming) on the economic analysis of science
and, speciﬁcally, on the characteristics of open science in contrast to proprietary science
(as research under the protection of intellectual property rights like patents is often called).
On incentives for voluntary contributions, see Hackl et al. (2005, 2007). On status as a
reward in itself, see Marmot (2004). See Merton (1973) on status as an incentive in science
and Hull (1988) on use as the basis of status. See Congleton (1989) on a model of status
seeking and competing VCMs.
3evaluation to those who have the necessary competence.2 This works quite
well even for ﬁnal consumers, but only because researchers coordinate on
reasonable quality standards and maintain them collectively. This brings us
back to the central question: Why and how do they do it?3
A third possible answer is based on the analysis of scientiﬁc competition
sketched above and invokes the folk theorem for inﬁnitely repeated games
(see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1991: 150-165). Researchers might use pun-
ishment strategies in order to enforce a certain selection of inputs: for in-
stance, never use the work of a researcher who used the wrong kind of input.
However, this kind of punishment strategy requires additional punishment
for those who do not punish, which makes correct behavior very diﬃcult to
monitor. A simpler way to achieve the same is a trigger strategy: as soon
as one researcher deviates from some norm, nobody uses the work of others
anymore.
2See Dasgupta and David (1994) and David (1998, 2004) for a theoretical and historical
explanation of the self-regulating character of open science. This explanation is, however,
incomplete; it must be supplemented by a model of scientiﬁc competition showing that self-
regulation can actually deliver high quality. The explanation problem becomes even more
severe once it is recognized that scientiﬁc quality standards are endogenous to science; see
below.
3It is sometimes doubted that the mode of scientiﬁc competition under discussion is
still relevant today; see, e.g., Ziman (2000). It is certainly true that some science policies,
starting with the 1980 U.S. Bayh-Dole act, have aimed at replacing scientiﬁc competition
by market competition. Still, open science is so far the only institutional alternative to
proprietary science and, therefore, worth understanding.
4However, these kinds of strategies are just not relevant in science. Inter-
esting research results are not discarded just because the author misbehaved
in some way. For instance, plagiarism certainly violates the norms of proper
scientiﬁc behavior. Nevertheless, it is usually not severely punished by the
scientiﬁc community because, in contrast to counterfeit data, it does not
aﬀect the quality of the research building upon the oﬀending publication.4
Subsequently, I explore a fourth mechanism based on a production func-
tion for research with a simple but intuitively plausible property: the quality
of the input aﬀects, at least stochastically, the quality of the output, that is,
quality is hereditary in scientiﬁc production.
Hereditary quality in a production process is common sense in most pro-
duction processes: from food over clothing to housing, high-quality inputs
are almost always necessary (if not suﬃcient) for producing high-quality out-
puts. For many quality characteristics in science, hereditariness is at least
plausible: Using simple models as part of a new model increases the chances
to produce a simple model. Using consistent assumptions as a basis increases
the chances to come up with a consistent model. Incorporating relations that
have survived statistical tests increases the chances of ﬁnding a statistical
model that will also stand up to empirical scrutiny.5
A link between input and output quality provides a rationale for re-
4See the critical discussion of Broad and Wade (1982) in Hull (1988).
5Albert (2007) shows that hereditariness of quality is an important feature of a falsiﬁ-
cationist methodology.
5searchers to be selective in the choice of inputs. Researchers use the work
of others if they think that it is good enough to build upon it (Hull 1988).
Hence, if a paper gets a negative evaluation, it will not be used by other
researchers, which means that the author fails in the quest for status. Thus,
given hereditary quality, high-quality papers are used and low-quality pa-
pers are discarded in equilibrium just because everybody expects this kind
of behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the research
process along the lines sketched above. Section 3 computes the most relevant
equilibria. Section 4 analyzes the dynamics of the research process in equi-
librium. Section 4 concludes. Some mathematical derivations are relegated
to an appendix.
2 An OLG Model of Scientiﬁc Competition
We consider an overlapping-generations (OLG) model. At each point in
time t = 1,...,∞, there are n active young researchers and n inactive old
researchers who were active at t−1. Each active researcher writes one paper,
which is published and can be used as an input by young researchers at t+1.
Production at t = 0 uses no papers as inputs. Young researchers at t > 0
ﬁnd, among the papers written in t − 1, exactly one paper relevant to their
own problem, which they might use as an input or not.6
6This is the simplest assumption. The model becomes more complicated if there are
always several relevant papers not all of which can be used. Nevertheless, the three kinds
6There are two diﬀerent qualities for papers, X or Y . Quality Z = X,Y
is high quality in equilibrium iﬀ Z-papers are used as inputs with a higher
probability than papers falling into the other category. Researchers can de-
termine the quality of a paper; however, they have no intrinsic preference for
either X-papers or Y -papers.7
Quality is hereditary. Using a Z-paper as an input increases the proba-
bility of producing a Z-paper as an output. Thus, let p be the probability
of writing an X-paper on the basis of an X-paper. Let q be the probability
of writing an X-paper on the basis of an Y -paper. Let r be the probabil-
ity of writing an X-paper without any paper as an input. We then assume
1 > p > r > q > 0, implying that a researcher cannot ensure that his paper
falls into a certain category.8
At time t > 0, each active researcher randomly draws one of the n papers
written at t−1, which is relevant to his problem and may be used as an input.
The n drawings are independent and with replacement. The probability of
of strict equilibria on which we focus below remain possible. It seems reasonable, there-
fore, to skip over the quite interesting questions raised by this extension, e.g.: Are there
plausible equilibria where the scientiﬁc community splits into subgroups with diﬀerent
quality standards? I am grateful to Harald Uhlig for alerting me to this possibility.
7Albert (2006) considers a model with a ﬁnite but arbitrary large number of qualities
combining into an endogenous quality scale.
8This assumption identiﬁes two probabilities that may be diﬀerent. The probability of
writing an X-paper may depend not only on the input but also on one’s aim: it may make
a diﬀerence whether one tries to write an X-paper or a Y -paper. A generalization along
these lines, however, seems to generate no additional insights.
7each paper to be drawn by researcher i = 1,...,n is 1
n. Hence, it is pure
chance whether a speciﬁc paper becomes relevant to a researcher of the next
generation. Each researcher of the next generation decides independently
whether to use a relevant paper or not. The expected number of uses of a
paper written at time t − 1 can therefore be computed as follows. Let πj,
j = 1,...,n the probability that researcher j will use the paper given that
he has drawn the paper. This probability may, among others, depend on the
quality of the paper. Given this probability, the probability that researcher
j draws and uses the paper is πj/n. Hence, each researcher adds πj/n to the
expected number of uses, which is therefore equal to the average probability




The state of the research process at time t is the number Xt of X-papers
available as inputs. This state is a random variable with possible values in
{0,1,...,n}. The transition probabilities from Xt to Xt+1 depend on the
strategies of the researchers.
Researchers have two actions, using the paper they have drawn as an
input (U) or discarding it (D). They maximize their expected utility on
the basis of identical utility functions. Utility depends on status and costs of
research. Status is equal to the number k of researchers of the next generation
who use one’s paper as an input for their research.9 A researcher’s costs c are
9This is a simpliﬁcation. Status is rank among one’s peers and should therefore be
relative to the success of others; see Albert (2006) for such a model. However, this point
is only relevant for the computation of the threshold values SZ on p. 11 below.
8low (c = cL ≥ 0) if the researcher uses a paper as an input; otherwise, the
costs are high (c = cH > cL). Thus, the quality, X or Y , of the paper used as
input enters neither utility functions nor cost functions. We assume a linear
utility function u(k,c) = αk − c, α > 0, which implies risk neutrality. With
risk neutrality, the expected utility of a researcher is equal to the u(a,c),
where a is the expected number of uses, or expected status.
The features of the research process described so far are assumed to be
common knowledge among all researchers. Generation t > 0 of researchers
has common knowledge of past and current states Xs, s = 1,...,t. Past
behavior of previous researchers and the papers they have drawn are known,
but he quality of the paper drawn by a current researcher is private infor-
mation in the researcher’s generation. The stage game in which researchers
decide whether to use the papers they have drawn is simultaneous.
Knowledge about the past is relevant for a researcher only insofar as this
knowledge can be used to compute his expected status aZ depending on
whether he writes a Z-paper, Z = X,Y . The diﬀerence in expected status,
then, is the motive for using or not using the paper a researcher has drawn
as an input since this decision inﬂuences the probability of producing an
X-paper. If |aX − aY| is small, a researcher will use any paper because the
decrease in costs by ∆c = cH − cL will dominate his decision. If |aX − aY |
is large, it may pay to discard the wrong kind of paper, that is, discard a
Y -paper if aX > aY , because higher costs are oﬀset by a higher probability
of producing an X-paper.
93 Equilibrium Analysis
This model, like many other OLG models, allows for a large number of equi-
libria. The focus in this paper, however, is on a speciﬁc question, namely,
whether there are Nash equilibria in which researchers consider only quality
when selecting inputs. For this reason, we are looking for equilibria where re-
searchers use only four pure strategies or mixtures of them. The pure strate-
gies are denoted by AB, A,B ∈ U,D, where A is the action upon drawing
an X-paper and B is the action upon drawing a Y -paper. We denote the set
of these four pure strategies and their mixtures by Q.
For any researcher, only the strategy choices of the next generation of
researchers are relevant. Given a mixed-strategy proﬁle drawn from Qn of
the researchers at time t+1, a researcher at time t = 1,2,... cannot improve
expected payoﬀs by using a strategy drawn from a set larger than Q.
As already shown in the last subsection, expected status is equal to
the average probability that the paper is used when drawn. This average
probability is determined by the paper’s quality and the average taken over
the mixed-strategy proﬁle of the next generation, which is itself a mixed
strategy from Q called the average strategy. Such a strategy is denoted
by π = (πUU,πUD,πDU,πDD) ∈ ∆4, where ∆4 is the four-dimensional unit
simplex and πAB is the probability of strategy AB.
We consider the best reply of a researcher at time t = 1,2,... to the
average strategy π = (πUU,πUD,πDU,πDD) ∈ ∆4 at time t+1. The expected
10status from writing an X-paper at time t is πUU + πUD, while the expected
status from writing an Y -paper at time t is πUU + πDU. Assume that a
researcher at time t draws an X-paper. If he uses this paper, he produces
an X-paper with probability p. Thus, the expected status from using an
X-paper is aX = pπUD + (1 − p)πDU + πUU. Analogously, the expected
status from using a Y -paper is aY = qπUD + (1 − q)πDU + πUU, and the
expected status from discarding the paper, whatever its quality, is aD =
rπUD + (1 − r)πDU + πUU. Since p > r > q, aX > aD > aY iﬀ πUD > πDU
and aY > aD > aX iﬀ πUD < πDU.
Expected utility is u(a,c) = αa − c. Expected utility from using a Z-
paper is u(aZ,cL), Z = X,Y . Expected utility from discarding the paper
drawn is u(aD,cH).
Consider ﬁrst the case πUD > πDU. The optimal strategy is UD or UU: an
X-paper should be used because this increases expected status and decreases
costs; an Y -paper can be used iﬀ the decrease in expected status is oﬀset by
the increase in costs, that is, iﬀ u(aY,cL) ≥ u(aD,cH) or πUD ≤ πDU + SX,
SX :=
cH−cL
α(r−q) > 0. In the limiting case πUD = πDU +SX, mixing UD and UU
is possible.
If, on the other hand, πUD < πDU, the optimal strategy is DU or UU:
Y -papers should always be used; X-papers can be used iﬀ the decrease in
expected status is oﬀset by the increase in costs, that is, iﬀ u(aX,cL) ≥
u(aD,cH) or πDU ≤ πUD + SY, SY :=
cH−cL
α(r−p) > 0. In the limiting case
πDU = πUD + SY , mixing DU and UU is possible.
11Table 1: Best replies at time t = 1,2,... to the average strategy π =
(πUU,πUD,πDU,πDD) ∈ ∆4 at time t + 1.
Average strategy in t + 1
πUD πUU = 1 πDU
= 1 ∈ (SX,1) = SX ∈ (0,SX) ∈ (0,SY ) = SY ∈ (SY ,1) = 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⊕ 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⊕ 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⊕ 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
X-selection weak X-selection no selection weak Y -selection Y -selection
As explained in the text, we have πUD + πUU = 1 or πDU + πUU = 1 and assume SX < 1 and SY < 1. The row strategies correspond
to the column strategies with the same number. The symbol ⊕ in a cell indicates that the row is a best reply to the column; otherwise,
the cell contains a zero.Hence, for individual as well as average strategies at all times, we have
πUD + πUU = 1 or πDU + πUU = 1, while πDD = 0. If SX > 1, πUD = 0; if
SY > 1, πDU = 0. In order to exclude no possibilities, we assume SZ < 1,
Z = X,Y . Table 1 shows the best-reply correspondence.
Since strategy choices at time t + 1 restrict strategy choices at time t =
1,2..., the set of possible sequences of strategy choices in equilibrium is
restricted. Appendix A derives nine types of equilibria that are possible
under our assumptions from table 1 by symbolic forward induction. Table 2
lists these types of equilibria. All of them are subgame perfect.
While there are inﬁnitely many equilibria, only three of them are strict:
the X-selection equilibrium, the Y -selection equilibrium, and the no-selection
equilibrium. The non-strict equilibria are rather implausible.10
In the Z-selection equilibria, researchers use only Z-papers as inputs. In
this sense, Z denotes high quality. However, high quality in this sense derives
not from individual preferences (which are neutral between X and Y ). The
belief that researchers use only Z-papers is a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
10Under an evolutionary, or social-learning, dynamics, the non-strict equilibria would
presumably play no role. However, evolutionary considerations are beyond the scope of
the present paper. Moreover, it seems to me that research strategies are often forward-
looking, which generates herding behavior, with immediate coordination (as assumed in
this paper) as an extreme case.
13Table 2: Nine types of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
Label Equilibrium strategies
1 X-selection πUD = 1 throughout
2 Transition from X-selection to
weak X-selection in t > 1
πs<t
UD = 1, πt
UD ≥ SX, πs>t
UD = SX
3 Weak X-selection πUD = SX throughout
4 Transition from no selection to
weak X-selection in t > 1
πs<t
UU = 1, πt
UD ≤ SX, πs>t
UD = SX
5 No selection πUU = 1 throughout
6 Transition from no selection to
weak Y -selection in t > 1
πs<t
UU = 1, πt
DU ≤ SY , πs>t
DU = SY
7 Weak Y -selection πDU = SY throughout
8 Transition from Y -selection to
weak Y -selection in t > 1
πs<t
DU = 1, πt
DU ≥ SY , πs>t
DU = SY
9 Y -selection πDU = 1 throughout
Assumption: SX < 1 and SY < 1.
144 The Dynamics of Equilibrium Production
Subsequently, we focus on the three strict equilibria, where all researchers
use the same strategy π = (πUU,πUD,πDU,πDD). This strategy determines
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Obviously, πX ≥ πY .
The probability that any given researcher at time t > 0 produces an X-
paper depends on the strategy π and the state Xt, that is, the number of
X-papers produced at t−1. The probability of drawing an X-paper in state
Xt = j is
j
n; the probability of producing an X-paper in state Xt = j, then,
is
wj = πY +
j
n
(πX − πY ). (1)
This implies that the state Xt develops according to a regular Markov





p)n−k the probability mass function of the binomial distribution. The tran-
sition probability from Xt = j to Xt+1 = k is tjk = b(n,k,wj); the rows of
11On Markov chains, see, e.g., Grimmett and Stirzaker (1992). Regularity means that
the transition matrix T has no zero entries. A regular Markov chain is irreducible, or
ergodic.
15the transition matrix, then, are given by the values of the probability mass
function of b(n,k,p) with expectations
E(Xt+1|Xt = j) =
n  
k=0
tjkk = nwj . (2)
Regularity implies that a unique stationary probability distribution of the
states exists, which is determined by the equation eT = e, where ej > 0, the
jth component of the row vector e, is the stationary probability of state j
and
 
j ej = 1.
We introduce some notation. Let Q = f(X) be a random variable de-
pending on the state of the process, with f(j) = qj, j = 0,1,...,n and,
therefore, Q ∈ {q0,q1,...,qn}. Let q = (q0,q1,...,qn) be the row vector of
the possible values of Q. The expected value of Q in the long run, then,
is E(Q) = eq′ (with ′ for transposition). Speciﬁcally, X ∈ {0,...,n} is
the state and x = (0,1,...,n) is the row vector of possible states. More-
over, W ∈ {w0,...,wn} denotes the probability of producing an X-paper
depending on the state, with the row vector w = (w0,w1,...,wn) of possible
probabilities.
We now compute some expected values. First, we compute the long-
run expected value of the state, E(X). From (2), we get Tx′ = nw′, since
E(Xt+1|Xt = j) = nwj is the expected value of the binomial distribution in




′ = nE(W). (3)
From (1), we get E(W) = πY + 1
n(πX − πY )E(X). With w :=
πY
1+πY −πX, this
16yields E(X) = nw and E(W) = w.
Let A ∈ {a0,a1,...,aN} be the expected status as a function of the state.
Let a = (a0,a1,...,an) be the row vector of the possible values of A. The
long-run expected value of A, then, is E(A) = ea′. We have
aj :=
j
n [aX(πUU + πUD) + aD(πDD + πDU)]+
n−j
n [aY (πUU + πDU) + aD(πDD + πUD)] .
From this, we ﬁnd E(A) for the three strict equilibria (see table 3):





n r = r +
j
n(p−r) = wj and, consequently, E(A) =
w < 1, where w = r
1+r−p.
• In the no-selection equilibrium, πUU = 1 and, thus, aX = aY = 1.
Hence, aj = 1 and, consequently, E(A) = 1.
• In the X-selection equilibrium, πDU = 1 and, thus, aY = 1 − q and
aN = 1 − r. Hence, aj =
n−j
n (1 − q) +
j
n(1 − r) = 1 − q +
j
n(q − r)
and, consequently, E(A) = 1−q+(q−r)w < 1, where w =
q
1+q−r and,
therefore, E(A) = 1−r
1+q−r.
Expected status in the no-selection equilibrium is higher than in the Z-
selection equilibria. The same goes for expected utility because researchers
in Z-selection equilibria have higher expected costs because the discard one
category of papers.
17Table 3: The Three Strict Nash Equilibria: Overview
General value X-selection No selection Y -selection
(πUU,πUD,πDU,πDD) πUD = 1 πUU = 1 πDU = 1
πX = p(πUU + πUD) + r(πDU + πDD) πX = p πX = p πX = r
πY = q(πUU + πDU) + r(πUD + πDD) πY = r πY = q πY = q
wj = πY +
j
n(πX − πY ) wj = r +
j
n(p − r) wj = q +
j











aX = pπUD + πUU + (1 − p)πDU aX = p aX = 1 aX = 1 − p
aD = rπUD + πUU + (1 − r)πDU aD = r aD = 1 aD = 1 − r
aY = qπUD + πUU + (1 − q)πDU aY = q aY = 1 aY = 1 − q
aj =
j
naX(πUU + πUD) +
j
naN(πDD + πDU) +
n−j
n aY (πUU + πDU) +
n−j
n aN(πDD + πUD)
aj = r +
j
n(p − r) aj = 1 aj = 1 − q +
j
n(q − r)
E(A) E(A) = r
1+r−p < 1 E(A) = 1 E(A) = 1−r
1+q−r < 1The X-selection equilibrium has a higher expected status than the Y -
selection equilibrium iﬀ p > 1 −
r
1−rq. In the case r = 0.5, this condition
implies p > 1 − q: higher expected status requires a higher probability of
reproduction. A higher expected status means also lower costs because higher
status is only possible if more potential inputs are used and less are discarded.
Thus, with r = 0.5, a higher probability of reproduction means a higher
expected utility. Thus, from the point of view of the researchers, the no-
selection equilibrium is best ex ante and in the long run, while the two other
equilibria are ranked according to the values of the reproduction probabilities.
5 Conclusion
The model of scientiﬁc competition proposed in this paper shows how endoge-
nous quality standards can emerge in scientiﬁc competition without invoking
the folk theorem. However, not any kind of quality standard can be estab-
lished in this way. Participants must believe that quality is hereditary in the
production process, that is, they must believe that the quality of the input
they use, which consists of ideas and results from other researchers, has an
inﬂuence on the quality of their research output.
In scientiﬁc competition, production decisions are not governed by the
evaluations of ﬁnal consumers. From the perspective of researchers, their
output serves only as an input for further research; there is no ﬁnal output.
Users outside science itself may proﬁt from research, or they may be hurt
19by it, but these eﬀects are external to scientiﬁc competition. The value of
research outputs in the eyes of the producers is determined by the demand
of an inﬁnite sequence of downstream producers who are all in the same
position. Hence, the results of research have no fundamental value within
science. Because quality is hereditary, every researcher tries to guess what
the next researcher would like to use, and selects his own inputs accordingly.
Since there are no contracts ﬁxing a price for papers satisfying some quality
norm, production proceeds on the basis of these guesses. This game has the
structure of a sequential beauty contest.12
There is a certain similarity to stock markets, where a similar beauty
contest also leads to the coordination on evaluation standards (Pratten 1993).
However, the need to coordinate on evaluation standards is more obvious on
stock markets, which use the price mechanism. Science, in contrast, uses
the voluntary contribution mechanism. Every researcher produces a unique
public good. Hence, there is no need to ﬁnd a common price. Without the
assumption of hereditary quality, which forges a link between input quality
and output quality, there would be no beauty contest.
The equilibrium in scientiﬁc competition is not necessarily ex ante eﬃ-
cient from the researchers’ point of view. Comparing an equilibrium where
a quality standard becomes established with an equilibrium where this is
not the case, we ﬁnd that the former is more competitive than the latter:
12On simultaneous beauty contests, together with experimental results, see, e.g.,
Camerer (2003: 209-218).
20researchers discard some inputs, which lowers expected utility. A similar
eﬀect exists in other beauty contests, where coordination on an equilibrium
reduces average payoﬀs. Thus, as in market competition, the competitive
mechanism diminishes producers’ rents. Whether this is good or bad for so-
ciety as a whole depends, of course, on the the quality standard itself. There
is no guarantee that the quality standard established in science reﬂects the
preferences of outsiders.
The model of this paper provides a basis for a critical discussion of diﬀer-
ent methodologies. Logical positivists tried to reduce methodology to logic.
However, Popper (1959) argued convincingly that methodological standards
are social conventions (see also H. Albert 1978, Jarvie 2001). The present
paper shows how certain methodological standards can become established in
science. The equilibria considered in this paper can be changed through un-
expected events that change expectations. Thus, methodological discussions
are potentially relevant: new arguments can change expectations and shift
the equilibrium. However, the equilibria have an objective basis in hereditary
quality; not just any quality standard can become established. Hence, the
present model provides a test for methodologies: if the qualities required by
a methodology are not hereditary in the research process, the methodology
is moot.
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23A Finding Nash Equilibria by Forward In-
duction
Consider the grouping of strategies in table 1: group 1 is X-selection (πUD =
1); groups 2 to 4 are diﬀerent cases of weak X-selection (1 > πUD > 0,
(πUD + πUU = 1)); group 5 is no selection (πUU = 1); groups 6 to 8 are
diﬀerent cases of weak Y -selection (1 > πDU > 0, (πDU + πUU = 1)); and
group 9 is Y -selection (πDU = 1).
Table 1 gives a best-reply correspondence on the basis of this grouping.
























⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ⊕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ⊕ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ⊕ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ⊕ 0 0























Each row is a proﬁle (s1,...,s9) with si ∈ {0,⊕}, i = 1,...,9. Let O be the
set of all such proﬁles. The 9 × 9 matrix of table 1 says for each group of
strategies whether the strategies of this group are best replies to the strategies
of the other groups. If the ith element of the jth row is ⊕, then the strategies
24of group j are best replies to the strategies of group i. Or in other words:
in equilibrium, the strategies from group j can be played at time t + 1 if a
strategy from group i was played at time t.
We can describe a process of “forward induction” by multiplying the
matrix Θ with itself and with row vectors from O. We use the standard
rules of matrix multiplication together with the following rules for multiplying
symbols: ⊕ × ⊕ = ⊕, x × 0 = 0 × x = 0, ⊕ + ⊕ = ⊕, x + 0 = 0 + x = x
where x = 0,⊕.
Let o ∈ O denote the best replies at time t. Then oΘ gives the best
replies at time t + 1 that are consistent with o. Speciﬁcally, let oj ∈ O,
j = 1,...,9 be the jth base proﬁle, that is, a proﬁl with ⊕ in place j and
zeroes everywhere else. Then ojΘ describes the strategy groups that are
possible at time t = 2 if strategy group j contains the best reply at time
t = 1. Similarly, ojΘ2 describes the strategy groups that are possible at
time t = 3, and so forth. These are the forward-induction steps. Obviously,
Θ2 = Θ and, therefore, Θs = Θ for all s = 1,2,..., which simpliﬁes the
considerations.
A Nash equilibrium can be found by forward induction in the following
way: Start with a base proﬁle. Multiply with Θ as above. Select one of
the possible resulting strategy groups, that is, a base proﬁle. Repeat ad
inﬁnitum.
25A single forward-induction step leads to the following results:
o1Θ=o1 + o2 + o3
ojΘ=o3 if j = 2,3,4
o5Θ=o3 + o4 + o5 + o6 + o7
ojΘ=o7 if j = 6,7,8
o9Θ=o9 + o8 + o7
(4)
Thus, starting from o1, a transition to o3 is possible at any time, with a
single intermediate appearance of o2; a deviation from o3 is impossible. From
considerations of this kind follow the Nash equilibria of table 2 in the text.
26